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INTRODUCTION
This paper considers the electoral performance of populist parties in three countries: the Netherlands, Poland and the United Kingdom. Populist parties are marked by an antiestablishment critique and an appeal to a community of 'ordinary people'. This topic has received widespread academic attention in recent years. Whereas many comparative studies aiming to explain the electoral performance of populist or other radical 'challenger' parties have focused on institutional variables and factors related to political opportunity structures, the role of the challenger parties themselves has often been overlooked. This study explicitly concentrates on the populist parties' own agency by considering their electoral credibility. In addition to the presence of a conducive environment, this is believed to be a vital factor in explaining the electoral performance of populist parties. In other words, conditions related to both the demand for, as well as the supply of, populist parties are deemed to play a crucial role. 1 The Netherlands and Poland are selected as they provide ideal 'laboratory environments' in which the success, but also the failure, of populist parties can be studied. The two countries have witnessed both the rise as well as the fall of populist parties in recent years and in both countries populist parties have entered government.
The paper compares successful and unsuccessful manifestations of populism within both cases. The (institutional) environment in which Dutch and Polish political parties have operated has remained relatively stable in recent years. Various structural variables are therefore controlled for, so that the impact of party agency can be assessed particularly well. By selecting a former communist country the paper also aims to encourage further research with a pan-European focus. 2 The third case that is selected is the United Kingdom, a country in which populist parties have played a marginal role on the national level. The UK serves as a 'negative'
case, yet the UK is also selected because the paper aims to show that also in countries with an institutional environment which is ostensibly hostile to the breakthrough of new (populist) parties, the agency of political parties matters. The UK applies a Single Member Plurality system in general elections, which tends to disadvantage smaller parties. As will be argued in this paper, however, it does not suffice to merely consider this institutional factor in explaining the failure of British populist parties.
The following section outlines how populist parties are defined in this paper and presents the theoretical points of departure. The remainder of the paper discusses the electoral performance of the populist parties in the three selected countries. As will be argued, unresponsive established parties can create a fertile breeding ground for populist parties, yet the latter parties only become successful if they present themselves as credible alternatives to the established parties.
POPULIST PARTIES AND THEIR ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE

Defining populist parties
Although populism can in some cases be conceived of as a fleeting rhetorical strategyarguably used by many political actors from time to time -the aim here is to identify populist parties which distinguish themselves by having populism at the very core of their appeal. Populist parties embody resistance against the established system of representative politics and it would be impossible to characterise such parties without taking their populist anti-establishment appeal into account. The way populism is used here is in line with the accounts that consider populism to be an ideology, albeit a 'thincentred' one. 3 This means that populism in itself does not provide an all-encompassing agenda of how society should function. As a result, parts of existing, more rooted ideologies can and should be added to the populist core.
In order to provide a definition of populist parties, this study seeks inspiration from contributions that provided clear and influential definitions of populism. 2) appeal to these ordinary people, whose interests and opinions should be central in making political decisions;
3) are fundamentally hostile towards the (political) establishment, which allegedly does not act in the interest of the ordinary people.
Populist parties appeal to a community of 'ordinary people'. It is not self-evident who belong to these 'ordinary people' and populist parties are often not very specific about their target audience. All populist parties do, nevertheless, explicitly claim to represent the interests of these 'ordinary people'. Populist parties are usually clearer about who does not belong to their portrayed community, which means that the community is typically constructed in a negative manner. 5 Immigrants and ethnic or cultural minority groups are usual suspects to be branded as outsiders. Not all populists are necessarily xenophobic. The group of 'others' could, for instance, also consist of corporate elites, the media or intelligentsia whose ideas, values and interests are at odds with those of the 'silent majority'. 6 Populist parties are in any case opposed to the political powers that be. As Cas
Mudde argues, the normative distinction between 'the people' and 'the elite' is essential to the populist discourse. 7 Residing in their ivory towers, the members of the political establishment have allegedly lost track of the everyday problems of the people. Populists are also wary of, if not hostile to, representative politics as far as this leads to complex decision-making procedures. 8 Populist parties demand a direct implementation of the people's wishes. A new way of decision-making is required; one that is straightforward, transparent and effectively copes with the people's problems.
That is not to say that populist parties necessarily intend to get their following directly involved in politics. Instead, they maintain that they know what the ordinary people want and that they are the ones who truly represent their interests. 9 Following Robert Barr, populism can be associated with a plebiscitarianist form of linkage between citizens and the political elite. 10 Populism emphasises the need for accountability of leaders, but not so much the need for political participation of citizens.
The Electoral Performance of Populist Parties
This study aims to explain the electoral performance of populist parties in three countries. Populism, at least in the Western European context, has more often than not been associated with the radical right and xenophobic politics. Even though this study intends to make an argument that applies to populist parties of all kinds, it does seek inspiration from the numerous studies on the electoral performance of the radical right, and other new or 'niche' parties. It is expected that populist parties are in some ways similar to other 'outsider' parties as far as the factors related to their electoral success or failure are concerned. This section will specify how such factors are supposed to apply to populist parties in particular. The emphasis will be on agential, rather than Similar agency-related factors are likely to apply to populist parties beyond the radical right as well. This paper will therefore take into account factors related to the appeal and the organisation of the populist parties in order to assess whether they have been electorally credible. First of all, it is expected that populist party leaders need to be sufficiently persuasive in order to seize the ownership of the issues central the party's appeal. The potential electorate of the populist party must be convinced that the party is better able to 'handle' the problems it identifies than its opponents. 19 It is important that the populist party attracts sufficient media attention and that the party figurehead(s) make a strong impression during the election campaign. Secondly, the credibility of a populist party is likely to wane in the eye of many voters when its rhetoric is too radical or when party members are associated with political extremism. 20 This applies to populist parties of the radical right in particular. Thirdly, it can be difficult for populist parties to credibly stick to their anti-establishment appeal and to present themselves as 'outsiders' in a convincing way once they enter government. After all, they then have to become part of the system they previously vehemently opposed. 21 Finally, party organisation is considered to be important in assessing the credibility of a populist party.
Particularly after their breakthrough, populist parties are likely to lose their credibility as competent political actors if they fail to preserve internal discipline and cohesion. 22 Since populist parties are generally leader-centred organisations, they are especially likely to fall apart when the leader departs or loses grip over the party.
Having outlined the theoretical and conceptual points of departure, the paper will now turn to the populist parties and their electoral performance in the Netherlands, Poland and the United Kingdom. With regard to each of these cases the electoral performance of the populist parties will be assessed, with a particular focus on the agency of the established and populist parties. By doing so, this study aims to answer the question of how to explain the recent electoral performance of populist parties in the three selected countries. The broader aim is to show that studying party agencyincluding the electoral credibility of populist parties themselves -is necessary in order to explain the electoral performance of populist parties in general.
THE NETHERLANDS
Background and context
The Netherlands has traditionally been dominated by three party families: the Christian Democrats, the Social Democrats and the Liberals. The dominant parties were closely aligned with the most significant religious and social groups. 23 The pure proportional electoral system applied for parliamentary elections was geared at securing proportional representation for each of these groups. However, the traditional group identities gradually weakened in the decades after the Second World War, as did the ties between the electorate and the traditional parties. 24 Before 2002 new parties nevertheless played a relatively modest role. This changed when the maverick populist politician Pim Fortuyn entered the political scene. 25 Fortuyn, a columnist and former sociology professor, founded his party List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) after he was expelled from the also newly formed party 'Liveable Netherlands'.
Fortuyn criticised the political establishment fiercely and stressed that power had to be returned to the 'people in the country'. out' of government, 37 and has continued to dominate the political debate.
POLAND
Background and context
The first decade of post-communist Polish politics was marked by a very fluid party system, whereby the lifespan of many parties was short. The proportional representation (PR) electoral system has been amended repeatedly since the transition to democracy, yet it has always been less conducive to the breakthrough of small parties than the Dutch system. Election results were very volatile regardless of institutional factors, not in the last place due to very low levels of party affiliation.
By the time of the parliamentary election of 2001, two camps had developed that could reasonably be perceived to make up the Polish political establishment after the transition to democracy: the communist-successor camp, emerging out of the former communist party, and the post-Solidarity camp, emerging out of the main opposition force against the communist regime. The two dominant political forces were mainly divided with regard to their stance towards the communist past and moral and cultural issues -the communist-successors adopting a more secular position. On the other hand, the camps were not strongly divided concerning socio-economic issues or foreign affairs.
Both sides were, for instance, committed to accession to the European Union. EU membership would also never become a hot topic in electoral campaigns or in terms of general public interest. 38 Support levels for EU accession had always been relatively high and the Eurosceptic sentiments that did exist, for instance among farmers, largely faded after the benefits of EU membership materialised. Despite the lack of a clearly developed programme, Self Defence could be considered as a left-wing populist party in terms of socio-economic policies and the party mainly attracted support in poorer rural areas.
Explaining populist party performance
As in the Netherlands, the agency of mainstream parties played a large role in explaining the performance of populist parties in Poland. Both radical parties clearly benefited from a widespread dissatisfaction with the Polish political elite. This dissatisfaction was partly based on bad economic circumstances. Economic growth slowed down and unemployment rose by the turn of the 21 st century. Polish voters also had reasons to be dissatisfied with the established politicians due to their involvement in corruption scandals and practices of clientelism throughout the 1990s. 41 Surveys indicated that in 1991 one-third of the Poles believed that corruption in public life was a 'very big' problem, whereas ten years later this figure was two-thirds, with a sharp increase in the year before the 2001 parliamentary election. 42 As a consequence, the 2001 election campaign was marked by a general antiestablishment mood. 43 Besides Self Defence and the League of Polish Families, also Law and Justice could profit from this mood. The latter party could capitalise on the strong crime-fighting image of former Justice Minister Lech Kaczyński. Self Defence leader
Lepper, in turn, was able to raise his electoral credibility by making 'an efficient transition from streetwise thug to persuasive spokesman for the poor and alienated'. 44 The League of Polish Families could particularly benefit from a pool of religious rightwing voters that became available after the demise of the post-Solidarity coalition. 45 The social democrats won the election of 2001, but the centre-left government that was formed after the election did not leave a better impression in terms of clean politics. It would soon become Poland's most unpopular government since the transition to democracy. 46 Unsurprisingly, the anti-establishment mood prevailed. In a survey from
June 2003 a great majority of respondents thought that politicians were dishonest (77%), unreliable (78%) and that they simply cared for their own interests (87%). 47 were subject of substantial negative news coverage. 50 As regards policy effectiveness even former spokesperson for Self Defence Mateusz Piskorski admitted that 'if we would find a kind of method to estimate the degree of programme realisation (…) it would be very small in the case of Self Defence, after two years of coalition. Very small'. 51 The coalition would eventually tumble in the summer of 2007. This happened shortly after Self Defence leader, and now Agriculture Minister, Lepper was accused of taking bribes, and subsequently dismissed.
Law and Justice remained popular among a significant section of the electorate.
The government refrained from radical austerity measures, unemployment was falling and the government received credit for its anti-corruption measures. 52 Due to its ceaseless emphasis on fighting corruption, Law and Justice still appealed to the voters who were concerned with probity in public life in particular. The party thus 'retained a loyal core of supporters prepared to give it the benefit of the doubt as long as it appeared to be delivering on its programme of moral and political renewal'. 53 Meanwhile, 'Normal people should run their own affairs and we didn't want to be run by a committee of unelected bureaucrats'. 54 In more recent years, after various leadership changes, the party has also taken a more restrictive position with regard to immigration.
As such, it began to stress an issue which had always been at the core of the programme of the British National Party. The BNP, founded in 1982, descended from the neo-fascist National Front. After the turn of the 21 st century the party aimed to cultivate a legitimate image by moving away from overt biological racism and by emphasising more commonplace 'local community' issues. 55 In the 2005 and 2010 general election manifestos the party also explicitly embraced democracy, whilst rejecting totalitarianism.
The BNP further promised to 'return power to the men and women of Britain, the taxpayers, pensioners, mums and dads and workers'. 56 It can well be argued that the BNP's change of direction is an opportune 'change of clothing' instead of a real break with the past. 57 When the electoral appeal of the party is taken at face value, however, it is appropriate to consider the 'new' BNP as a populist party. The party has combined a strong anti-establishment rhetoric with an explicit appeal to the 'ordinary British folk'. 58 Even though both UKIP and the BNP saw their share of the vote increase in recent general elections, the parties never received more than 3.1% and 1.9% of the nationwide vote, respectively (in the 2010 general election). Under the Single Member Plurality electoral system, neither of the parties ever came close to winning a single seat, not even in their main target constituencies.
The electoral system provides a potential explanation for the failure of populist parties in Britain. Smaller parties are likely to be disadvantaged under a plurality system in terms of the distribution of seats. Voters may also anticipate the mechanical effects of the electoral system and refrain from voting for these parties in the first place. 59 The results of the Liberal Democrats in British general elections, however, show that it is not impossible for a third party to win a significant amount of votes (over 20% in 2005 and 2010) . Considering the electoral system alone is thus unlikely to be sufficient when explaining the failure of the British populist parties.
Data from the 2010 British Election Survey provides support for this claim. 60 The data does suggest that the electoral system has an impact on voting behaviour in Britain. Of all respondents 8.1% stated they voted for another party because their preferred party stood no chance of winning in their constituency. Another 8.9% of the respondents indicated that they voted tactically. For about two-thirds of these two groups of voters, however, the party actually preferred was one of three major parties.
Only 15% of these respondents stated the party they preferred was UKIP, whereas 6.4% who answered that the Liberal Democrats would be most capable. 66 Another 9% of the respondents gave 'other party' as a response.
As regards the issue of European integration, the British electorate has been very Eurosceptic from the outset. According to Eurobarometer data, in 2009 only 28% of the respondents thought that EU membership was a good thing. 67 'Europe' has at the same time been an issue of low salience to voters and was above all an issue accentuating divisions within mainstream parties. 68 Since the end of the 1990s, however, the Conservative Party adopted an increasingly Eurosceptic position, resulting in a clear dominance of Eurosceptic sentiments within the party's parliamentary fraction. 69 With regard to both the issues of immigration and European integration, then, at least one of the established parties has been responsive to the opinions of many voters.
Yet the fact that neither UKIP nor the BNP was able to seize the ownership of both issues was also largely due to the agency of the populist parties themselves. Even though the BNP has attempted to forge a 'clean' image, the party found it hard to get rid of its extremist stigma. 70 It has been difficult for BNP leader Nick Griffin, for instance, to refute having repeatedly voiced his doubts about the occurrence of the Holocaust. Even though the BNP might attract a small niche of xenophobic voters, it has remained a party which is 'beyond the pale' for more mainstream voters. This is indicated by the results of an opinion poll stating that 66% of the respondents would 'under no circumstances' consider voting for the BNP. 71 Different from the populist parties in the Netherlands, then, an extremist image curbed the electoral credibility of the BNP.
UKIP's lack of popularity, in turn, is more related to the relative indistinctiveness of the party's appeal, which is mainly centred around its negative attitude towards European integration. 72 In terms of visibility and leadership the party has also failed to impress. In the words of former MEP Graham Booth: 'Our problem is: we are all unknowns, nobody knows who the hell we are'. 73 The only truly high-profile leader was former chat show host Robert Kilroy-Silk, but he proved to be a highly divisive figure.
UKIP, as the BNP for that matter, has been plagued by intra-party quarrels throughout its existence, even though the parties' organisational troubles did not receive widespread public attention.
Even if the electoral system can be assumed to have played a part in the failure of British populist parties, the agency of established and populist parties also needs to be By pointing out the importance of the agency of populist parties as regards their electoral performance, this paper steps away from the idea that populist parties only rely on uninformed protest votes. Even if these parties thrive on dissatisfaction with the political elite, there is more to populist parties' electoral success than the presence of anti-political sentiments alone. It matters whether the issues central to the appeal of populist parties resonate with the ideas of their potential electorates. As this paper has indicated, in line with Mudde's assertion, leadership and organisation also play an important role. 75 Populist parties need to convey a resonant message in a convincing way in order to become successful. To explain their electoral performance we thus have to consider the demand for, as well as the supply of, populist parties.
Even though this message may sound rather obvious, comparative studies have often neglected the agency of populist parties, or other radical outsiders. This is not entirely surprising as operationalising a concept such as 'electoral credibility' is rather difficult, especially when the aim is to measure credibility quantitatively. This is no excuse, however, for excluding such a crucial factor from the analysis. This study has suggested a way to assess the electoral credibility of populist parties in cross-national research. Further contributions are welcome which develop a more comprehensive measurement of electoral credibility of political parties. There is also room for further research assessing which elements of electoral credibility, for instance related to leadership or organisational stability, are relevant under different circumstances.
NOTES
